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Abstract
Although immigrant integration policies have long been hypothesized to be associated with 
majority members’ anti-immigrant sentiments, systematic empirical research exploring this 
relationship is largely absent. To address this gap in the literature, the present research takes a 
cross-national perspective. Drawing from theory and research on group conflict and 
intergroup norms, we conduct two studies to examine whether preexisting integration policies 
that are more permissive promote or impede majority group members’ subsequent negative 
attitudes regarding immigrants. For several Western and Eastern European countries, we link 
country-level information on immigrant integration policies from 2007 with individual-level 
survey data from the Eurobarometer 71.3 collected in 2009 (Study 1) and from the fourth 
wave of the European Value Study collected between 2008 and 2009 (Study 2). For both 
studies, the results from multilevel regression models demonstrate that immigrant integration 
policies that are more permissive are associated with decreased perceptions of group threat 
from immigrants. These findings suggest that immigrant integration policies are of key 
importance in improving majority members’ attitudes regarding immigrants, which is widely 
considered desirable in modern, immigrant-receiving societies. 
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1. Introduction
A vast number of studies reveal marked differences in how European nation states approach 
the integration of immigrants with regard to integration policies (for example, see Geddes, 
2003; Howard, 2005). Immigrant integration policies are broadly defined here as the 
institutional practices adopted by state agencies to deal with the settlement of immigrants in 
host societies (Bourhis et al., 1997). Parallel to this line of research, another set of studies 
demonstrates persistent cross-national variation in the prevalence of anti-immigrant attitudes 
among European citizens (Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, Raijman, & 
Gorodzeisky, 2006). However, although immigrant integration policies have long been 
hypothesized to be important in shaping attitudes regarding immigrants (Bourhis et al., 1997; 
Favell, 2001), systematic empirical research exploring this relationship is largely absent. 
Indeed, scholars have repeatedly emphasized the need to account for country-level political 
characteristics in order to advance understanding of the contextual sources of anti-immigrant 
sentiments (e.g. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010, p. 310; Kunovich, 2004, p. 41; Schlueter & 
Wagner, 2008, p. 169). This study is designed to contribute to this task. We start from the 
notion that immigrant integration policies can be placed on a continuum ranging from 
‘restrictive’ at one end to ‘permissive’ at the other (Bourhis et al., 1997; Geddes, 2003). At 
the restrictive end of the continuum, the provision of equal rights to immigrants is contingent 
on several preconditions and is somewhat limited, whereas at the permissive end, equal rights 
are relatively readily granted and are comprehensive. There are two main views concerning 
the way in which integration policies affect attitudes regarding immigrants. Following a group 
conflict model (e.g. Meuleman et al., 2009), the first view suggests that permissive immigrant 
integration policies will stimulate intergroup competition. Consequently, those taking this 
perspective predict that integration policies that are more permissive will increase perceptions 
of group threat from immigrants. The opposing view, informed by the literature on group 
norms in intergroup relations (Chong, 1994; Pettigrew, 1991), considers integration policies 
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as inducing social norms for adequate intergroup relations. This implies that immigrant 
integration policies that are more permissive will decrease the perceived group threat from 
immigrants. In examining these opposing predictions, we try to improve on earlier work in 
several ways. As a theoretical contribution, we connect immigrant integration policies as a 
contextual characteristic, with prior theory and research on group conflict and intergroup 
norms. As outlined above, doing so produces two opposing predictions regarding the way in 
which immigrant integration policies shape attitudes regarding immigrants. Empirically, we 
take advantage of the recently developed Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, see 
Niessen et al., 2007) in order to assess immigrant integration policies. This comparative 
database provides indicators for six different strands of integration policies, and thus offers 
more detailed information than was available to most prior researchers. Furthermore, in 
combining this national-level information on integration policies with individual-level data on 
perceived group threat, we capitalize on an unusually comprehensive data source. 
Specifically, our data comprises of 27 countries not only from Western, but also from Eastern 
Europe. This broad set of country-cases substantially enhances the generalizability of our 
findings. Finally, we are able to cross-validate our results using cross-sectional data from the 
Eurobarometer wave 71.3 collected in 2009 (Study 1) and from the fourth wave of the 
European Value Study collected between 2008 and 2009 (Study 2). This replication provides 
more accurate conclusions on the country and individual-level parameter estimates than was 
possible in past research (Beckers, 2010; Rosenthal, 1991). 
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 2. Theory and previous research
2.1 Group conflict model
Why would integration policies affect majority group members’ anti-immigrant reactions? 
One important theoretical perspective from which to approach this question is through using 
the group conflict model, or equivalently the group threat model (for example, see Meuleman 
et al., 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002; for theoretical origins, see Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). 
The key assumption underlying this perspective is that majority group members and 
immigrants are locked into competitive intergroup relationships. According to this approach, 
anti-immigrant sentiments and behaviors result from perceived group threat, broadly defined 
here as concerns that immigrants challenge the well-being of the majority group (Stephan & 
Renfro, 2002, p. 197; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006, p. 336). On an empirical level, most 
researchers have modeled perceived group threat as a single construct (Scheepers et al., 2002; 
Semyonov et al., 2006; Kunovich, 2004; Schlueter & Wagner, 2008; Davidov & Meuleman, 
forthcoming)1. It is nevertheless instructive to note that such threat perceptions typically refer 
to resource-based, economic matters, as well as to symbolic, cultural issues (McLaren, 2003; 
Stephan & Renfro, 2002). To expand on this, economic threats reflect concerns about 
intergroup competition with immigrants for valued goods, such as well-paid jobs or welfare 
state resources. Cultural threats refer to concerns that immigrants adhering to different morals, 
norms, and values endanger the cultural order of the majority. The group conflict model 
contends that such subjective experiences of intergroup rivalry are centrally shaped by the 
characteristics of the contexts within which intergroup relationships take place. In this line of 
thinking, countries have proved to be important contextual units of analysis (for example, see 
McLaren, 2003; Kunovich, 2004; Scheepers et al., 2002). Indeed, it is at the country level 
where policies concerning the integration of immigrants are usually drafted. Given that 
integration policies regulate immigrants’ access to valued goods, it seems appropriate to 
connect integration policies with the group conflict approach. For example, consider 
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integration policies that provide immigrants with relatively encompassing rights. Such 
institutional directives might indeed improve immigrants’ opportunities in the domains of 
educational participation, political decision making, or employment. However, according to 
the group conflict approach, members of the majority group will perceive such gains on the 
part of the immigrant population as a loss of their own group’s important resources. This 
means that integration policies that are more permissive will promote notions of intergroup 
competition, and thereby heighten majority members’ perception of group threat. This logic 
also holds true for threats referring to symbolic issues, where it is presumed that majority 
group members wish to maintain the cultural predominance of their own group. Therefore, 
challenges to this predominance - such as integration policies that ease the recognition of 
immigrants as national citizens - should also result in heightened perceptions of group threat.
2.2 The role of norms in intergroup relationships
The group conflict model outlined above suggests that immigrant integration policies that are 
more permissive will increase perceived group threat. However, such policies can also be seen 
as institutionalized norms regarding the desired role of immigrants in society. Intergroup 
norms have long been considered as “major sociological means of understanding intergroup 
relations” (Pettigrew, 1991, p. 3), and have considerable potential to shape majority group 
members’ attitudes regarding immigrants (Bourhis et al., 1997). For example, Allport (1954) 
contends that prejudice - an immediate consequence of perceived group threat (Schlueter, 
Schmidt & Wagner, 2008; Stephan & Renfro, 2002) - is reduced when social norms become 
more tolerant, just as less-tolerant social norms increase prejudice (Allport, 1954, p. 471). 
Two broad perspectives illuminate how the normative influences of integration policies on 
intergroup attitudes might occur. Focusing on short-term changes in intergroup attitudes, the 
first view suggests that majority group members adapt their pre-existing attitudes in response 
to legislative measures, presumably because they recognize that deviations from a social norm 
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produce negative sanctions. To put it in the words of Allport (1954): “It is a well-known 
psychological fact that most people accept the results of an election gladly enough after the 
furore has subsided […] They allow themselves to be reeducated by the new norm that 
prevails” (p. 471; see also Chong 1994, p. 32). In line with this perspective, research on 
interracial relations in the U.S. has documented that changes in public sentiment in response 
to policy changes often occur within a relatively short space of time (Chong 1994, p. 37f.; 
Colombotos, 1969, p. 319f.). Consistent with a group norm perspective (Sherif & Sherif 1953, 
p. 202f.; Merton, 1968), Friedman (1984) attributes widespread attitudinal change in this 
domain to “peer pressure (or other messages from the crowd)” (Friedman 1984, p. 220). A 
second view on how immigrant integration policies affect majority members’ intergroup 
attitudes derives from the literature on political socialization (Almond & Verba, 1963; Jaros, 
1973; Rohrschneider, 1999). Focusing on long-term changes in intergroup attitudes, the idea 
underlying this view is that a country’s immigrant integration policies are also reflected by the 
curricula of the country’s educational institutions (Eurydice, 2005). Accordingly, younger 
generations of majority group members which become exposed to these curricula during their 
formative years are expected to internalize what is considered as normatively appropriate 
intergroup relations in a given country (Weil, 1985; Westie, 1964, pp. 583-584). This 
approach clarifies how integration policies might lead to long-term changes in intergroup 
attitudes via cohort replacement. While the two approaches outlined above focus on different 
(short-term vs. long-term) aspects of how immigrant integration policies might affect 
individual-level attitudes, they do not appear mutually exclusive. Rather, both processes are 
likely to operate in tandem and converge, reinforcing the prediction that integration policies 
that are more permissive will decrease majority members’ perceived group threat.
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2.3 Hypotheses 
To sum up, the primary concern of this study is to examine the contribution of immigrant 
integration policies for cross-national variation in majority members’ levels of perceived 
group threat. A group conflict perspective suggests integration policies that are more 
permissive will stimulate interethnic competition, which in turn will increase perceptions of 
group threat. If this view is correct, then country-level policies that are more permissive will 
be positively related with perceived group threat. By contrast, the normative theory of 
intergroup relations lead us to expect that immigrant integration policies prescribe what is 
considered as adequate intergroup relations in a given country. This approach predicts that 
immigrant integration policies that are more permissive will reduce perceived group threat. If 
this is the case, then the association of country-level policies that are more permissive with 
perceived group threat will be negative.
2.4 Previous research
Interestingly, to date the hypotheses outlined above have received only little scholarly 
attention. Moreover, the few studies which explicitly focus on the nexus between integration 
policies and anti-immigrant attitudes leave considerable room for improvement. For example, 
Weldon (2006) used multilevel regression models to investigate survey data collected in 1997 
from 15 Western European countries. He found that majority group members’ tolerance of 
ethnic minorities was systematically linked to the citizenship regimes and cultural policies 
that were implemented. Higher levels of tolerance were found in countries that provided more 
opportunities for the acquisition of nationality and provided comparatively greater cultural 
rights to immigrants. Irrespective of the innovative character and careful design of Weldon’s 
study, there are some obvious methodological problems with it. Clearly, the study fell 
somewhat short in terms of country coverage. Due to data limitations, as Weldon himself 
noted (2006, p. 346), the sample of countries in his study was restricted to a rather 
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homogenous set of Western European countries. However, perhaps the most important 
limitation of his study is related to the operationalization of the integration policies context. 
Weldon (2006) classified countries into three discrete ideal-types. Although useful, it remains 
unclear to what extent this classification adequately reflected the considerable diversity in 
immigrant integration policies characterizing contemporary European nation states. Jacobs 
and Herman (2009) followed a different approach. Their study operationalized immigrant 
integration policies using a set of quantitative indicators from the Migrant Policy Index 
(MIPEX, see Niessen et al., 2007 - an approach we describe in more detail below). Jacobs and 
Herman (2009) assess aggregate, country-level correlations by using answers to various 
immigration-related items from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey Series. In 
virtually all cases the authors found positive correlations between generous integration 
policies and positive attitudes regarding immigrants. However, for several reasons this 
contribution is also problematic. Proper inferences regarding the association between country-
level integration policies and attitudes measured at the individual level require adequately 
accounting for the hierarchical structure of such data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Unfortunately, Jacobs & Herman (2009) conducted aggregate analyses only. Additionally, 
most correlation coefficients in their study do not reach conventional levels of significance, a 
fact which is probably due to insufficient statistical test power. Finally, it must be noted that 
the survey data used by Jacobs & Herman (2009) was collected several years prior to the 
implementation of the integration policy indicators compiled by Niessen et al. (2007). In light 
of this, the results are essentially mute regarding the question if and to what extent preexisting 
immigrant integration policies are associated with subsequent attitudes regarding immigrants. 
3. The present research
The primary goal of the present research is to establish whether the degree of permissiveness 
of immigrant integration policies is positively or negatively associated with the majority 
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members’ perceived group threat. We conducted two studies to accomplish this goal. We used 
quantitative indicators to assess country-level immigrant integration policies and employed 
individual-level survey data collected in 25 (Study 1) and 27 (Study 2) Western and Eastern 
European countries. This broad empirical source has both strength and limitations. As 
mentioned above, it is unusually rich in terms of country coverage. As an added advantage, it 
also provides alternative – albeit similar – measurements of perceived group threat. These 
features help in cross-validating the pattern of results, a strategy which heretofore seems 
underused in cross-national comparative research. On the other hand, our data shares the 
typical design problems of cross-sectional studies without random assignment. This means 
that we cannot make claims of causality and all of our results should be considered as 
correlative. However, we take several steps to increase confidence in our results. Specifically, 
we attempt to alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias by including several individual-level 
and country-level control variables. Further, in order to establish temporal precedence of our 
central independent variable, we use a time-lagged measurement of immigrant integration 
policies. Using a lagged measure is also advantageous because it is likely to take some time 
for country-level policies to affect individual-level perceptions of threat. 
3.1 Study 1
3.1.1 Dataset
In Study 1, we examine our theoretical expectations using data from the Eurobarometer 71.3 
wave (Gesis, 2011). Face-to-face interviews for this survey were conducted based on 
nationally representative samples of respondents aged 15 years and above in 31 European 
countries between June and July 2009. We selected 25 countries for which immigration policy 
indicators were available, and excluded all non-nationals from the samples. The final pooled 
sample size comprised of Ni = 21,799 individuals nested in Nj = 25 countries, namely: 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
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Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
3.1.2 Variables
3.1.2.1 Dependent variable. We assess our dependent variable, perceived group threat, using 
the respondents’ assessments of four statements. These statements are: (i) “Immigrants can 
play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of the 
world”; (ii) “People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of [our country]”; (iii) 
“The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in [our country]” 
and (iv) “We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy”. To illustrate, 
negative answers to the statements (i) or (ii) reflect perceived cultural threats. The domain of 
economic threats is tapped by items (iii) and (iv), the logic being that, for example, 
disagreeing with the idea that a country’s economy profits from immigrants in the labor 
market reflects some form of negativity towards immigrants. Original response options were 
given in a dichotomous format (1 = tend to agree, 2 = tend to disagree). We coded all items so 
that higher scores reflect a higher degree of perceived group threat. Before testing our 
structural hypotheses based on multilevel modeling, we examined the cross-national 
comparability of the average scores for perceived group threat using multigroup confirmatory 
factor analyses. Employing robust, weighted least squares estimation procedures to account 
for the ordinal scaling of the four indicator variables (Millsap & Tein, 2004), the results 
support partial equivalence2 across countries. This means that within-country changes on the 
latent factor lead to similar changes on the four indicator variables across the 25 country 
samples. We then used the sum of the single responses from the four indicators to create an 
index of perceived group threat. In order to ease interpretation of the unstandardized 
regression coefficients, we rescaled this index to range from a minimum score of 0 to a 
maximum score of 100 (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken & West 1999).
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3.1.2.2 Independent variable. We assess country-level immigrant integration policies, our 
central independent variable, by taking advantage of the 2006 version of the Migration Policy 
Index (MIPEX, see Niessen et al., 2007). This comparative measurement of the integration 
policies of European countries combines several desirable features. First, the MIPEX includes 
a wide variety of policy domains. This makes it possible to use a conceptualization of 
integration policy that goes beyond just legislation on the acquisition of nationality, a factor 
that has often been used previously3. Specifically, the MIPEX comprises six policy strands: 
(1) access to the labor market; (2) long-term residence; (3) family reunification; (4) political 
participation; (5) access to nationality; and (6) anti-discrimination. Second, the MIPEX is 
based on ratings by independent experts. This clearly increases the degree of objectivity in the 
evaluation of integration policies. Finally, as an added advantage the MIPEX also offers a 
very timely assessment of national integration policies, which might help in drawing applied 
conclusions from our findings. The MIPEX evaluates each policy domain using scores 
between 0 (worst practice) and 100 (best practice). Because preliminary analyses indicated 
substantial correlations among the indicators of the six policy dimensions (Cronbach’s α = .
83), we averaged these scores to provide a single measurement of integration policies.
3.1.2.3 Control variables. Our primary aim in this research is to examine the 
association between preexisting immigrant integration policies and cross-
national differences in perceived group threat. However, as noted earlier, 
our research design is based on cross-sectional data without 
randomization. Therefore, to reduce concerns that the associations we 
present reflect the influence of some omitted variable, we include several 
individual-level and country-level variables. To begin with, higher levels of 
educational attainment are known to be associated with lower levels of perceived group threat 
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and more positive attitudes towards minority groups in general. This relationship is attributed 
to multiple mediators, such as a broadened worldview, greater cognitive sophistication or 
increased empathy (Vogt, 1997). Educational attainment is assessed using four categories 
based on the age at which the respondents left full-time education (1 = no full-time education; 
2 = 15 years or below; 3 = 16 to19 years; and 4 = 20 years or above/still studying).  We also 
include a measurement of respondents’ employment status (0 = other; 1 = unemployed), the 
rationale being that self-interest theories of interethnic competition state that perceptions of 
immigrants as economically threatening are increased for unemployed individuals (Scheepers 
et al., 2002). Living in a larger community presumably leads to greater exposure to social 
heterogeneity, with improved attitudes towards minority groups as a result (Stouffer, 1954). 
Community size is measured using a dichotomous indicator (0 = other, 1 = living in a larger 
community). Because scapegoat theories of prejudice suggest that general feelings of 
frustration can become projected upon minority groups (Glick, 2005), we also include a four-
category single measure of respondents’ life satisfaction (1 = very satisfied to 4 = not at all 
satisfied). We recoded this indicator so that higher scores indicate more life satisfaction. As is 
the convention in previous research, we additionally consider the relationship of respondents’ 
age (measured in four categories, 1 = 15 to 24 years; 2 = 25 to 39 years; 3 = 40 to 54 years; 4 
= 55years and above) and gender (1 = male; 2 = female) with perceived group threat. We also 
examine the relevance of several country-level characteristics other than immigrant 
integration policies. A larger immigrant group size is often seen to give rise to increased 
perceived group threat (Semyonov et al., 2006), and can certainly be related to the integration 
policies that are implemented (Ruhs & Martin, 2008). We assess immigrant group size as the 
national percentage of non-EU immigrants in 2007, the latest year for which data was 
available. This data was taken from the Mimosa project (Mimosa, 2008). Unfavorable 
economic conditions are also considered to intensify interethnic competition, and thereby to 
increase negative sentiments towards immigrants (Semyonov et al., 2006; Cummins & 
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Rodriguez, 2009). To measure unfavorable economic conditions, we use the national 
unemployment rates for 2008 (ILO, 2010). Two additional country-level controls we include 
are conservatism and welfare state extensiveness. Specifically, it is conceivable that both 
immigrant integration policies and majority members’ perceived group threat follow from the 
prevailing degree of conservatism in a society1. To account for this possibility, we include the 
cabinet share of conservative parties (Armingeon et al., 2012) into our models. One further 
alternative hypothesis refers to the degree of a country’s welfare state expansiveness. Crepaz 
& Damron (2009) report that majority members in countries with more extensive welfare 
states tend to hold less discriminatory attitudes towards immigrants. Presumably, welfare 
states that are more extensive are characterized by a greater general inclusiveness, which 
expands to immigrants. Thus, any correlation between a country’s general social policy and 
its more specific immigrant integration policies might bias our findings. To control for this 
possibility, we also introduce the total amount of public social expenditures in our models 
(Eurostat 2012).
3.1.3 Method
With respondents (individual level) being nested in countries (contextual level), our data is 
presented as a hierarchical two-level structure. To adequately deal with this nested 
information, we estimate a series of linear multilevel regression models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002) which build incrementally. After calculating the initial amount of country-level 
variance in perceived group threat, model 1 accounts for the associations of the individual-
level control variables on this dependent variable. In model 2, the measurement of immigrant 
integration policies is included. In models 3 to 6, the contextual-level control variables are 
added. All models were estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. 
3.1.4 Results
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
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Figure 1 indicates that European majority populations show considerable variations in levels 
of perceived group threat, as country-means on the threat scale range from 21.4 (in Sweden) 
to 81.4 (in Malta).  Most Eastern European countries appear at the higher end of the threat 
scale (Poland is an exception here), whilst the lowest levels of perceived group threat are 
found amongst the Scandinavian countries. Southern and Western European countries do not 
indicate any consistency in the perceived threat ranking.
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
Considerable cross-country variation is also found for immigrant integration policies, which 
range from 30 (Latvia) to 85 (Sweden). Overall, the least permissive integration policies are 
predominantly found in Eastern Europe. The group of countries with the most generous 
integration policies is very diverse, including traditional immigration countries such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands, Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland), and countries that have 
only recently started to experience considerable inflows of immigration (such as Portugal and 
Italy). Figure 1 displays a clear negative association between immigrant integration policies 
and the perceived group threat from immigrants (r = - .69, p < .001; Nj = 25). This suggests 
that more permissive integration policies are associated with decreased perceptions of 
threatened group interests. However, this preliminary evidence is only based on aggregated 
data and does not account for any contribution from the individual and country-level control 
variables. To achieve a more conclusive understanding of how integration policies relate to 
perceived group threat, we now turn to the results from hypotheses tested using multilevel 
regression modeling. 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
We first estimated a random effects ANOVA including no covariates. The corresponding 
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) suggests that approximately 14.8 per cent [= (198.56 / 
(198.56 + 1137.29) × 100] of the total variance in perceived group threat can be found at the 
country level.  This result indicates that multilevel modeling is appropriate to account for the 
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variance existing between countries. Table 1 summarizes these results and presents both 
unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients4. Model 1 controls for the association 
of the individual-level control variables with perceived group threat. The data show that the 
parameter estimates for gender, age and being unemployed are insignificant. The remaining 
findings resemble established knowledge by revealing that higher educational attainment (b = 
-7.33, p <.001) and greater levels of life satisfaction (b = -4.86, p <.001) show significantly 
negative associations with perceived group threat. To illustrate the strength of these 
associations, we can use the total range of the variable scores. For example, within countries, 
the predicted difference between the respondents with the lowest and highest levels of life 
satisfaction is around 15 points. The corresponding difference for educational attainment is 
approximately 22 points. As one might expect, all these individual-level associations lead to a 
large reduction in the model deviance (Δ -2LL = 7136.26). However, what is more important 
is the finding that even after controlling for these associations a substantial degree of country-
level variance remains (11.7 per cent). In model 2, attention shifts to the test of our central 
theoretical expectations and the index assessing immigrant integration policies is introduced 
into the model. Contrary to a group threat perspective, but in line with the normative approach 
to intergroup relations, the findings demonstrate a significantly negative association between 
the permissiveness of a country’s integration policies and citizens’ perceived group threat (b = 
-.64; p <.001; Δ -2LL = 19.49). Taking into account the range of the policies-index, the 
predicted difference in perceived group threat between countries with the lowest and highest 
degree of permissiveness in integration policies is around 35 points – a considerable 
difference5. The corresponding standardized regression coefficients is β = -.74. This means 
that two otherwise similar individuals living in countries which differ by 1 SD in their 
integration policies can be expected to differ by about 0.73 SD in perceived group threat. We 
furthermore find that approximately 54% of the total between-country variance in perceived 
group threat can be attributed to differences in immigrant integration policies. In order to 
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examine the robustness of these findings, models 3 to 6 account for the country-level control 
variables. The results reveal that neither the share of non-EU immigrants nor a country’s 
economic standing are significantly related to citizens’ threat perceptions from immigrants 
variables (see also: Davidov & Meuleman, forthcoming; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Strabac & 
Listhaug 2008). The data also provide no support for the assumption that country-level 
conservatism or the degree of welfare state extensiveness contribute to the cross-national 
differences in perceived group threat. In other words, these additional findings indicate that 
the negative association of immigrant integration policies with perceived group threat is 
unaffected by the control variables6 in the model.   
Discussion
The results of Study 1 clearly indicate that respondents from countries where more permissive 
immigrant integration policies prevail perceive less group threat from immigrants as 
compared to respondents from countries characterized by more restrictive immigrant 
integration polices. This finding deviates from the expectations we deduced from group threat 
theory, yet is consistent with the assumptions underlying the normative approach to 
intergroup relations. In an attempt to further probe into and cross-validate this empirical 
pattern), we turn next to Study 2. 
3.2 Study 2
3.2.1 Dataset
Study 2 capitalizes on data from the fourth wave of the European Value Study, conducted in 
2008 and 2009 (EVS, 2010). Face-to-face interviews were conducted with nationally 
representative samples of respondents aged 16 years and above in 47 European countries. We 
selected the same 25 countries for which migration policy indicators were available (as in 
Study 1), plus Norway and Switzerland. After exclusion of non-nationals and people born 
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outside the country of data col lection, the final sample size was Ni = 34,412 individuals 
situated in Nj = 27 countries. 
3.2.2 Variables
3.2.2.1 Dependent variable. We use five variables from the EVS 2008 to operationalize 
perceived group threat. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked “Please look at the 
following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale”. The 
answer options for the five items all ranged from (1) to (10): (i)“Immigrants take jobs away 
from natives in a country” vs. “Immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country”; 
(ii) “A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants” vs. “A country’s cultural life is 
not undermined by immigrants”; (iii) “Immigrants make crime problems worse” vs. 
“Immigrants do not make crime problems worse”; (iv)“Immigrants are a strain on a 
country’s welfare system” vs. “Immigrants are not a strain on a country’s welfare system” 
and (v) “In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society” vs. “In 
the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society”. Clearly, these 
items represent face-valid indicators of majority members’ perceptions that immigrants 
threaten the well-being of their ingroup. After reversing, higher scores indicate stronger 
perceptions of group threat. In order to test the idea that these items represent single 
measurements of one underlying latent variable that is measured in a comparable way across 
countries, we performed multiple group confirmatory factor analyses. The final model 
provided support for partial scalar equivalence for most countries, which is sufficient for 
interpreting the results of a multilevel analysis7. We then constructed an index of perceived 
group threat by adding together the scores for the single items, and rescaled this index to 
range from a minimum score of 0 to a maximum score of 100.
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3.2.2.2 Independent variable.  We assessed immigrant integration policies using the 2006 
version of the Migration Policy Index (Niessen et al., 2007) in the same way as in the first 
study. 
3.2.2.3 Control variables. The control variables in study 2 are conceptually identical to the 
control variables we included in study 1. In the EVS 2008/2009, educational attainment was 
measured by seven categories: 0 = pre-primary education or no education; 1 = primary 
education or first stage of basic education; 2 = lower secondary or secondary stage of basic 
education; 3 = (upper) secondary education; 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary education; 5 = 
first stage of tertiary education; and 6 = second stage of tertiary. Gender was coded with 
males as reference category (1 = males; 2 = females). Age was measured in four categories 1 
= 15-24 years; 2 = 25-39 years; 3 = 40-54 years; 4 = 55years and above. Respondents’ 
employment status was coded as 0 = other and 1 = unemployed. Life satisfaction was 
measured with a single items (1 = dissatisfied; 10 = satisfied). The indicator for the size of the 
community where the interview took place ranges from 1(= fewer than 2000 inhabitants) to 8 
(= 500 000 or more inhabitants). All country-level control variables - the percentage of non-
EU immigrants, unemployment rate, conservatism and welfare state expansiveness - were 
measured in the same way as in study 1. 
3.2.3. Results
We first explored the relationship between integration policies and perceived group threat on 
an aggregate level by means of a scatter plot; country-means on the EVS-threat scale range 
from 47.1 (in Sweden) to 79.3 (in Malta).
--- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
The pattern shown in Figure 2 resembles the clear negative association depicted earlier. In 
fact, the bivariate Pearson’s correlation coefficient is r = -.51 (p < .01, Nj = 27).We followed 
the same modeling strategy as in the foregoing analyses. Table 2 summarizes the results. 
19
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
The results from a random effects ANOVA show that the approximate amount of country-
level variance in the alternative measurement of perceived group threat is about 10.6 per cent 
[= (61.62 / (61.62 + 518.7) ×  100] - a proportion which is quite substantial. The subsequent 
model 1 accounts for the individual-level control variables. Whereas the parameter estimates 
for gender (b = -1.21; p < .001), age (b = .47; p < .05) employment status (b = 1.14; p < .05) 
and community size (b = -.34; p < .05) all reach conventional levels of significance, we note 
that the size of these associations appear as somewhat negligible.8 The remaining results 
reconfirm that higher educational attainment (b = - 3.39; p < .001) and higher degrees of life 
satisfaction (b = -1.15; p < .001) are negatively associated with perceived group threat. To 
illustrate, within countries, the predicted difference between respondents with the lowest and 
highest level of education is about 20 points on the EVS-threat scale. As to be expected, 
including the individual-level predictors leads to a considerable reduction in the model 
deviance (Δ -2LL = 24347). However, the primary finding from model 1 is that the remaining 
country-level variance in perceived group threat (9.7 per cent) cannot be attributed to 
compositional differences alone. In model 2, we reassess the association of immigrant 
integration policies with perceived group threat. The results provide renewed evidence of a 
significantly negative association between the permissiveness of immigrant integration 
policies and perceived group threat (b = -.27; p < .001)9. Using the unstandardized regression 
coefficients and the total range of the policies-index, it turns out that the predicted difference 
on the EVS-threat scale between the countries with the least and most permissive integration 
policies is around 14.5 points. Accompanied by a reduction in the country-level variance by 
about 26%, the standardized parameter estimate is β = -.51, which is a sizeable association. 
As in the foregoing analyses, we next examined whether these findings change when 
additional country-level characteristics are included. Consistent with the preceding findings, 
the results from models 3 to 6 show that immigrant group size, the unemployment rate, 
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country-level conservatism as well as the degree of welfare state extensiveness are unrelated 
with cross-national differences in perceived group threat. 
3.2.4 Discussion
Study 2 reconfirms evidence that immigrant integration policies are key in understanding 
cross-national differences in perceived group threat among majority group members. 
Controlling for alternative individual and country-level predictors, relatively more 
permissive immigrant integration policies proved to be significantly negatively related 
to perceived group threat. Thus, by replicating the empirical pattern of Study 1 using a 
different operationalization and a different sample, Study 2 considerably increases our 
confidence in the negative association of relatively restrictive integration policies and 
individually perceived group threat. 
4. Overall Discussion
The central goal of this article was to develop a clearer understanding of how preexisting 
immigrant integration policies are associated with subsequent perceptions of threatened 
group interests. To achieve this goal, we developed and tested two opposing theoretical 
explanations.  A group conflict perspective led us to expect that immigrant integration 
policies that are more permissive would increase perceptions of threatened group 
interests. By contrast, building on and extending normative theory in intergroup 
relations, we theorized that integration policies that are more permissive would decrease 
such threat perceptions. We examined the empirical adequacy of these contrasting 
expectations from a cross-national, multilevel perspective. For this purpose, the recent 
availability of innovative integration policy indicators allowed us to assess cross-
national differences in immigrants’ access to equal rights much more precisely than 
previous studies have been able to10. Additionally, in following the idea of cross-
validation, we have been able to replicate our central results using data from two 
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independent cross-national survey studies. Collectively, our findings provide 
cumulative evidence that immigrant integration policies are systematically associated 
with perceptions of threatened group interests. Controlling for alternative individual-
level and country-level variables, we find no support for the assumption that integration 
policies that are more permissive stimulate intergroup competition and thereby are 
positively associated with perceived group threat. However, more permissive 
integration policies prove to display a robust negative association with perceived group 
threat. This empirical pattern is consistent with our theoretical argument that immigrant 
integration policies shape the societal norms for what is considered as appropriate 
intergroup relations which, in turn, affect attitudes regarding immigrants. Thus, the 
group norm approach outlined here provides a useful framework for conceptualizing 
how variation on immigrant integration policies may link to variation in perceived 
group threat. In addition, some limitations of this study need to be acknowledged, in 
part because they open up promising avenues for future research. First, as noted before, 
we stress that our research design shares the problems of all cross-sectional studies 
without randomization. It is critical to note that all results presented in this research are 
correlational. Of course, we cannot totally discount the possibility that the relationships 
between immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat we present reflect in 
part the influence of some omitted variable. However, we have been able to alleviate 
these concerns in several important ways. To reduce the possibility of omitted variable 
bias, we included a comprehensive set of control variables suggested by prior theory 
and research. Moreover, the fact that we were able to replicate our findings across two 
different cross-national data sets increases our confidence in the reliability of our 
results. In addition, to increase confidence in the temporal ordering of variables in our 
main analyses, we used a lagged measurement of immigrant integration policies. 
Nonetheless, an interesting complementary question is whether a reciprocal relationship 
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exists in that majority members’ perceptions of threatened group interests also affect 
national-level policies (Weldon, 2006). Intuitively, the broad idea that policy makers are 
responsive to the preferences of their electorate seems to imply such a reciprocal 
relation (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 1983; but see Sharp, 1999). 
However, most existing theorizing argues against the expectation that immigrant 
integration policies represent a simple function of anti-immigrant sentiments. For 
example, Freeman (1995; see also Sharp, 1999) claims that public opinion on 
immigrants and immigration is typically not sufficiently crystallized to influence the 
formation of policies in this domain. Relatedly, Massey (1999, p. 313) writes that “Most 
citizens […] are politically apathetic, leaving immigration policies to be determined 
quietly by well-financed and better organized special interests operating through 
bureaucratic channels”.11 We suspect that negative sentiments towards immigrants 
might still be important. Specifically, Breunig & Luedtke (2008) suggest that because 
“courts tend to defend minority rights against majoritarian sentiment” (Breunig & 
Luedtke, 2008, p. 127), any link from public opinion on immigrant integration policies 
will be contingent on the presence of judicial review in country. Future research 
initiatives drawing on cross-national longitudinal data might profitably investigate this 
line of reasoning. Such research could also benefit from additional methodological 
perspectives. In particular, small-N case studies (Yin, 2003) might help to shed more 
detailed light on the nexus of immigrant integration policies and intergroup relations. 
There are further issues. For example, data limitations prohibited a more thorough test 
of the short and long-term normative influences of immigrant integration policies on 
intergroup attitudes as we have discussed. Similarly, the present research could not 
provide direct evidence for the presumed mediating role of intergroup norms when 
linking immigrant integration policies to perceived group threat. Future research 
initiatives containing explicit measurements of intergroup norms might investigate this 
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macro-micro link more thoroughly. In this study, we attempted to extend previous 
knowledge on negative sentiments towards immigrants by examining two opposing 
theoretical views on how immigrant integration policies relate to perceived group threat. 
In line with this objective, we refrained from investigating which individual-level 
associations might vary across countries, and which country-level characteristics might 
moderate such variation. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to ask, for example, how 
ideological predispositions relate to perceived group threat, and whether the strength 
and direction of these relationships are contingent on certain structural or political 
country-level characteristics (Pardos-Prado, 2011). Pursuing these types of questions 
could considerably advance our understanding of how individual-level and country-
level characteristics relate to perceived threats from immigrants.  Related to this, the 
study did not allow investigation of whether the development of social norms 
proscribing direct expressions of negative attitudes regarding immigrants (i.e. 
perceptions of threatened group interests) give rise to more socially acceptable forms of 
such negative sentiments (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Investigating 
these unresolved issues clearly represents a fruitful research perspective. Further 
opportunities to improve upon this study concern measurement issues. With regard to 
the quality of comparative data on integration policies, the MIPEX project is certainly a 
huge leap forward. However, data on some important dimensions of integration policies 
currently remains unavailable, for example the distribution of cultural rights to 
immigrants and the degree to which state agencies support the distinctive linguistic or 
religious characteristics of immigrant groups (Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel, 
2012). Data permitting, a natural extension of this study would be to focus on how 
cross-national differences in the provision of cultural rights relates to the prevalence of 
perceived (cultural) group threat12. A more complete understanding of the role of 
immigrant integration policies in intergroup relationships between majority members 
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and immigrants might also be achieved by examining the consequences of perceived 
group threat, such as policy preferences (Mughan & Paxton, 2006) or anti-immigrant 
discriminatory intentions (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). In concluding, we also 
consider the practical implications of the present research. In short: To the extent that 
improved interethnic attitudes are a desired policy objective, our findings suggest that 
considering permissive immigrant integration policies offers a fruitful strategy to 
understand variations in such attitudes.
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Tables:
Table 1. Multilevel linear regression models for perceived group threat (study 1, EB 2009).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables b β b β b β b β b β b β
Sex .42
(.65)
.012 .42
(.65)
.012 .42
(.65)
.012 .42
(.65)
.012 .42
(.65)
.012 .42
(.65)
.010
Age -.92
(.54)
-.029 -.92
(.54)
-.029 -.92
(.54)
-.029 -.92
(.54)
-.029 -.92
(.54)
-.029 -.92
(.54)
-.029
Education -7.33***
(.64)
-.187 -7.33***
(.64)
-.187 -7.33***
(.64)
-.187 -7.33***
(.64)
-.187 -7.33***
(.64)
-.187 -7.33***
(.64)
-.187
Employment Status .43
(1.3)
.013 .43
(1.3)
.013 .43
(1.3)
.013 .43
(1.3)
.013 .43
(1.3)
.013 .43
(1.3)
.013
Life Satisfaction -4.86***
(.51)
-.114 -4.86***
(.51)
-.114 -4.86***
(.51)
-.114 -4.86***
(.51)
-.114 -4.86***
(.51)
-.114 -4.86***
(.51)
-.114
Community Size -1.85*
(.72)
-.055 -1.85*
(.72)
-.055 -1.85*
(.72)
-.055 -1.85*
(.72)
-.055 -1.85*
(.72)
-.055 -1.85*
(.72)
-.055
Immigrant Integration Policies --- --- -.64***(.09)
-.739 -.64***
(.09)
-.743 -.64***
(.09)
-.739 -.65***
(.11)
-.749 -.58**
(.15)
-.674
Immigrant Group Size --- --- --- --- -.18(.43)
-.058 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployment Rate --- --- --- --- --- --- -.11(.83)
-.018 --- --- --- ---
Conservatism --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- .62(1.28 )
.067 --- ---
Social expenditure --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -.23(.41) 
-.101
Individual-level variance 1083.38 1083.38 1083.38 1083.38 1083.38 1083.38
Country-level variance 144.77 65.39 64.92 65.33 64.73 64.53
-2LogLikelihood 216028.873 216009.376 216009.195 216009.358 216009.142 216009.059
Note. Parameters are unstandardized (b) and standardized (β) regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  (two-tailed).
Table 2. Multilevel linear regression models for perceived group threat (study 2, EVS 2008/9).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent Variables b β b β b β b β b β b β
Sex -1.21***(.33)
-.053 -1.21***
(.33)
-.053 -1.21***
(.33)
-.053 -1.21***
(.33)
-.053 -1.21***
(.33)
-.053 -1.21***
(.33)
-.053
Age .47*(.18) 
.034 .47*
(.18) 
.034 .47*
(.18) 
.034 .47*
(.18) 
.034 .47
(.18)
.034 .47
(.18)
.034
Education -3.39***(.31) 
-.20 -3.39***
(.31) 
-.20 -3.39***
(.31) 
-.20 -3.39***
(.31) 
-.20 -3.39***
(.31)
-.20 -3.39***
(.31)
-.20
Employment Status 1.14*(.53)
.05 1.14*
(.53)
.05 1.14*
(.53)
.05 1.14*
(.53)
.05  1.14*
(.53)
.05  1.14*
(.53)
.05
Life Satisfaction -1.15***(.11)
-.10 -1.15***
(.11)
-.10 -1.15***
(.11)
-.10 -1.15***
(.11)
-.10 -1.15***
(.11)
-.10 -1.15***
(.11)
-.10
Community Size -.34*(.14)
-.035 -.34*
(.14)
-.035 -.34*
(.14)
-.035 -.34*
(.14)
-.035 -.34*
(.14)
-.035 -.34*
(.14)
-.035
Immigrant Integration Policies --- --- -.27***(.08)
-.51   -.27***
(.08)
-.51 -.27***
(.08)
-.51 -.27***
(.08)
-.53 -.27***
(.08)
-.53
Immigrant Group Size --- --- --- --- -.01(.33)
-.007 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployment Rate --- --- --- --- --- --- -.79(.56)
-.22 --- --- ---
Conservatism --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- .65(.96)
 .11 --- ---
Social expenditure --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- .06(.29)
.11
Individual-level variance 487.31 487.31 487.31 487.31 487.31 487.31
Country-level variance 52.51 38.86 38.86 36.1 38.19 38.79
-2LogLikelihood 295937.88 295929.84 295929.83 295927.8 295927.38 295929.73
 Note. Parameters are unstandardized (b) and standardized (β) regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
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Table A (appendix).Variables and descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean/SD or 
percentage).
Variables 
Study 1
(Eurobarometer 73.1)
Study 2
(European Value Study 2008/9)
Min.-Max.
Mean (SD) 
or percentage Min.-Max.
Mean (SD) or 
percentage
Individual-level 
Sex (ref.= male) 0-1 55.7% 0-1 55.3%
Age 1-4 2.92 (1.05) 1-4 2.96 (1.02)
Employment Status
(ref. = other, 1= unemployed)
0-1 8.4% 0-1 5%
Education 1-4 3.14 (.75) 0-6 3.02 (1.37)
Life Satisfaction 1-4 2.05 (.79) 1-10 7.3 (2.08)
Community Size
(ref.= other, 1= urban)
0-1 53.4% 1-8 4.18 (2.37)
Perceived Group Threat 0-100 49.07 (36.16) 0-100 59.35 (24.01)
Country-level
Immigrant Integration 
Policies 30-85 52.84 (14.07) 30-85 53 (13.94)
Immigrant group size              
(% non-EU immigrants) 0.76-15.56 6.33 (3.78) 0.76-15.56 6.42  (3.69)
Unemployment Rate 3.40-18.00 9.00 (3.67) 2.50-18.00 8.55  (3.88)
Cabinet Share of 
Conservative Parties 1-5 2.74 (1.3) 1-5 2.75 (1.28)
Social Expenditure (% GDP) 12.7-31.01 23.03 (5.33) 12.7-31.01 23.13 (5.16)
FIGURES:
Figure 1. Immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat (study 1, EB 2009).
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Figure 2. Immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat (study 2, EVS 2008/9).
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Endnotes
37
1  One might speculate that in part, this common practice is due to the typically rather 
limited number of indicators available in large-scale survey studies. However, Stephan, Ybarra, 
Martinez, Schwarzwald and Tur-Kaspa (1998) assess perceived group threat in a very detailed 
and comprehensive manner. Still, these authors report that modelling different forms of threat 
as belonging to one common construct is superior to more nuanced approaches.
2  The fit measures of the model we chose was CFI = .962; TLI = .932; RMSEA = .096. We 
acknowledge that the RMSEA falls somewhat above of what is considered as a good model fit. 
With this limitation in mind, we examined whether excluding certain countries would alter the 
results from the multilevel analyses. However, the substantial conclusions remained unchanged. 
Note that the distinction between metric and scalar invariance used for multigroup analyses of 
indicators with continuous scales is not salient for multigroup analyses of indicators with 
categorical scales (Davidov et al., 2010). 
3   For example, see the Citizenship Policy Index [CIP] by Howard (2005). For an overview of 
related indices, see Janoski (2010, p. 36). Although certainly useful, none of these related 
indices covers as many European countries as the MIPEX used in this research. 
4  To calculate the standardized regression coefficient β for dichotomous independent 
variables, the unstandardized regression coefficient b was divided by the standard deviation of 
the dependent variable. In this way, β expresses the change for the dependent variable in 
standard deviation units when the independent variable changes from the reference category to 
one (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2010, p. 642). 
5 Additionally, we re-estimated Model 2 several times, each time including one of the six 
specific MIPEX policy strands (see section 3.1.2.2) instead of the general index. All regression 
coeffcients show a negative sign and are of substantial size, ranging from β = -.285 (for long 
term residence) to β = -.66 (for labor mobility), with only the coefficient for long term 
residence falling slightly below conventional levels of significance (p = .09). These more 
detailed analyses essentially suggest that our conclusions are not driven by a single policy 
domain, and support our approach of using a general integration policy index. More detailed 
results can be obtained from the authors.
6  In supplementary analyses, we also explored whether using the gross domestic 
national product as indicator of a country’s economic condition would lead to different 
conclusions. However, this was not the case.
7  While the fit of the final model was good (CFI = .979; TLI = .974; RMSEA = .075), 
this model violated partial scalar equivalence: Four countries out of 27 (namely Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, and Norway) have only one constrained intercept (instead of two as required 
for partial scalar equivalence – see Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). However, these 
unequal measurement parameters turn out hardly to affect country mean estimates. Country 
means for this final model and the fully scalar equivalent model correlate very strongly (r = 
0.95, p < .001), indicating that the observed deviations in intercepts and factor loadings are 
negligible. For these reasons, we decided to retain the four deviating countries in the analysis. 
As a test of robustness, we repeated the multilevel analyses reported below without the four 
deviating countries. The conclusions remain identical.
8  It seems reasonable to attribute the statistical significance of these substantially small 
associations to the large sample size used in this analysis. 
9  For Study 2, we also estimated several models using one of the six specific MIPEX policy 
strands instead of the general index. Whereas the negative regression coefficients for long term 
residence (β = -.21, p =.12 and antidiscrimination (β = -.29, p = .10) fall just below 
conventional levels of two-tailed significance, all remaining domain-specific effect parameters 
are significantly negative at p <. 01 and substantial in size (ranging from β = -.217 for long-
term residence to β = -.54 for labour market mobility). 
10  We did not aim to answer the additional question of which factors explain the degree of 
permissiveness of a country’s immigrant integration policy (see for example Howard, 2005; 
Janoski, 2010). This may be an important topic for future research that may deepen our 
understanding of the relationships between immigrant integration policies and threat from 
immigration, but is beyond the scope of our study.
11  In supplementary analyses, we used a micro-macro multilevel model (Croon & van 
Veldhoven, 2007) to explore the possibility of a link from perceived group threat to country-
level immigration policies. Such a link would exist if perceived group threat remains 
significantly associated with subsequent immigrant integration policies after controlling for 
prior levels of immigrant integration policies (Finkel, 1995). Accordingly, we regressed MIPEX 
scores from 2010 (Huddleston, Niessen, Chaoimh & White, 2011) on the MIPEX scores from 
2007 (Niessen et al., 2007) and country-level variation in perceived group threat from 2009 
(study 1) respectively 2008/9 (study 2). The results show strong autoregressive parameter 
estimates for immigrant integration policies (study 1: β = .96, p < .001; study 2: β = .96; p < .
001), and non-significant parameter estimates for perceived group threat (study 1: β = -.04; p = .
21; study 2: β = -.004; p = .95). 
12  It is interesting to note that in contemporary socio-psychological research, there is also an 
active debate on whether (perceived) multicultural ideologies (which might be seen as a 
consequence of macro-level institutional arrangements) foster or reduce anti-outgroup prejudice 
(for example, see Morrison, Plaut & Ybarra, 2010).
